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___________ 
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___________ 
 




GEORGE N. GREENE, JR., 
        Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
Division of St. Thomas and St. John 
D.C. Criminal No. 3-09-cr-00032-001 
(Honorable John E. Jones III) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 April 11, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed  June 17, 2011 ) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 George Greene, Jr., a sergeant with the Virgin Islands Police Department, was 
convicted after a jury trial on two charges of unlawful possession of firearms with 
obliterated serial numbers in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1)(B). The 
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court sentenced Greene to concurrent 30-month terms of imprisonment followed by two 
years‟ supervised release and imposed a $100 special assessment on each count. We will 
affirm.  
I. 
 Greene was arrested on August 4, 2009, after a grand jury in the District of the 
Virgin Islands indicted him and two co-defendants. In conjunction with Greene‟s arrest, 
federal law enforcement officials executed a search warrant on his police vehicle. The 
agents discovered two handguns with obliterated serial numbers hidden in a shaving kit 
in Greene‟s personal backpack. The backpack also contained ammunition suited to those 
particular firearms, a black ski mask, a book titled “The Art of Deception: An 
Introduction to Critical Thinking,” and a DVD titled “Barry Cooper‟s Never Get Busted 
Again.” In a voluntary statement furnished following his arrest, Greene told law 
enforcement he would occasionally masquerade as a corrupt officer for intelligence-
gathering purposes.  
 The superseding indictment charged Greene with fifteen counts, and the District 
Court granted Greene‟s motion to sever Counts Twelve and Thirteen, which alleged 
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1)(B). At the trial on those two counts, 
Greene testified he came into possession of the firearms, which had no paperwork or tags 
associated with them, in the regular course of his work in the Forensics Unit. He also 
testified he placed the guns in his backpack with the intent of turning them over to 
Corporal Alvaro de Lugo, an agent allegedly designated as the VIPD liaison to the U.S. 
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Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Greene‟s trial counsel attempted to elicit 
testimony about Greene‟s prior dealings with de Lugo, but the District Court concluded 
Greene could not proffer an adequate foundation for such testimony and sustained the 
government‟s objection to that line of questioning. The court also denied Greene‟s 
request for a jury instruction that would have permitted the jury to convict only if it found 
Greene had been acting outside the scope of his law enforcement duties while in 
possession of the firearms. 
 The jury found Greene guilty on both counts.
1
 Greene filed a motion for a new 
trial, alleging his brother had been excluded from the voir dire of prospective jurors in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The District Court denied the 





                                                 
1
 Following a separate jury trial in the related case from which these two charges were 
severed, Greene was convicted on six other counts included in the superseding 
indictment: (1) conspiracy to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (2) 
extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2; (3) conspiratorial extortion, conflict 
of interest, and solicitation and receipt of a bribe, in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 551; (4) 
extortion under color of official right, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 701 and 11; (5) conflict 
of interest, in violation of 3 V.I.C. §§ 1102(3) and 1108, and 14 V.I.C. § 11; and (6) 
solicitation and receipt of a bribe, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 403 and 11. The court 
sentenced Greene to a 36-month term of imprisonment on the federal charges (Counts 5 
and 6), to be served concurrently with the 36-month term imposed on the territorial 
charges (Counts 7 through 10).  
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction over 
the court‟s final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Greene argues the court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial under Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 33.
3
 Greene claimed his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated 
when a court security officer (CSO) temporarily excluded his brother, Curtis Fredericks, 
from the courtroom on the morning of January 20, 2010.
4
 At an evidentiary hearing, CSO 
Hyram Graneau testified he excluded Fredericks for want of seating space in the 
courtroom.
5
 Significantly, Graneau testified the trial judge was not on the bench when the 
                                                 
3
 “Ordinarily, we review a denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion 
standard.” United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1993). “[A] court abuses its 
discretion when its ruling is founded on an error of law or a misapplication of law to the 
facts.” Planned Parenthood of Central N.J. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 265 (3d 
Cir. 2002). Our review is plenary, however, when the court‟s denial was “based on the 
application of legal precepts.” Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1994). 
4
 Greene and his two co-defendants moved for a new trial on analogous grounds 
following their convictions on the counts from which these two firearms charges had 
been severed. Chief Judge Gomez, who presided over the extortion trial, held an 
evidentiary hearing and took sworn testimony. With the record complete, the parties 
declined to present additional testimony or argument relative to Greene‟s unique Rule 33 
motion. At the evidentiary hearing, Fredericks alleged he had been excluded in identical 
fashion on the morning of January 25, 2010. See United States v. Saldana, Crim. No. 
2009-32, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75019, at *6 (D.V.I. July 25, 2010). Although 
Fredericks claimed to have been excluded from “jury selection,” the court found the 
record indicated he had probably been denied access only to “jury attendance,” an 
administrative undertaking performed by courtroom personnel prior to the judge being 
called to the bench during which jurors receive their Juror Numbers. Id. at *17, 21. The 
court found no authority supporting an extension of the Sixth Amendment “to a non-
judicial event preceding trial, such as jury attendance.” Id. at *21. Similarly, Fredericks 
“guess[ed]” he had been permitted to enter the courtroom on January 20 after the 
completion of “jury selection.” Nevertheless, our conclusion that the partial closure was 
not of constitutional significance renders immaterial the factual question of whether 
Fredericks was inadvertently excluded from the voir dire on January 20.  
5
 CSOs are employed by private companies working under contract with the U.S. 
Marshal Service and are not part of the judiciary. 
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 In his motion, Greene relied principally on Presley v. Georgia, --- U.S. ----, 130 S. 
Ct. 721 (2010), a per curiam opinion handed down two days before the jury returned its 
verdict in this case. In Presley, the Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment extends to 
the voir dire of prospective jurors and concluded a defendant‟s right to a public trial had 
been violated by the trial court‟s exclusion of his uncle from the proceeding. Id. at 722, 
724-25. Here, the trial judge wrote: 
The glaring, significant difference between Presley and the case sub judice 
is that in Presley, the trial judge excluded the public from the courtroom 
during jury selection. Here, the exclusion of the public from voir dire was 
undertaken, apparently unilaterally, by the court security staff at the St. 
Thomas, United States Virgin Islands Federal Courthouse. This 
distinguishing fact resolves the instant Motion. While it is regrettable that 
Greene‟s brother was excluded from the Courtroom during jury selection 
by the CSO, the CSO‟s exclusion of Fredericks cannot and should not be 
imputed to this Court. It is the Court‟s view that the Supreme Court did not 
intend the holding of Presley to be extended to unilateral actions taken by 
court security staff about which the trial judge was completely unaware. 
We thus perceive no error of constitutional proportions and thus no basis 
whatsoever to afford Greene a new trial premised upon this unfortunate, but 
de minimus, breach. 
The court expressed confidence court security officers would “no longer exclude the 
public from jury selection” following the two days of hearings conducted with respect to  
                                                 
6
 The government styles Greene‟s failure to object a waiver forfeiting his right to a public 
trial. Because we find the partial closure did not amount to a constitutional violation, we 
need not decide whether Greene waived his Sixth Amendment rights. 
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the merits of these motions.
7
 
 In general, the denial of a defendant‟s right to a public trial is a “structural 
error”—i.e. a defect “affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds”—
requiring reversal irrespective of whether the defendant demonstrates the error prejudiced 
his substantial rights. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (canvassing 
cases and delineating the scenarios in which structural errors have been recognized). “It 
does not necessarily follow, however, that every deprivation in a category considered to 
be „structural‟ constitutes a violation of the Constitution or requires reversal of the 
conviction, no matter how brief the deprivation or how trivial the proceedings that 
occurred during the period of deprivation.” Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112, 120 (2d 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 61 (2009). That is, “not every improper 
partial closure implicates [Sixth Amendment] concern[s].” Brown v. Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d 
529, 536 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Bowden v. Keane, 237 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that a defendant‟s right to a public trial “is not trammeled, for example, by a 
trivial, inadvertent courtroom closure”); Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir. 
2000) (holding the exclusion of one spectator from an entire trial “does not implicate the 
policy concerns that inform the Sixth Amendment‟s right to an open trial”).  
 Whether a particular closure abridges a defendant‟s Sixth Amendment rights 
hinges on its potential to undermine the values advanced by the public trial guarantee, 
                                                 
7
 Greene contends this was not an isolated incident. However, the court solicited 
testimony from court staff and court security officers during the evidentiary hearing and 
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which include (1) ensuring a fair trial; (2) reminding the government and the judge “of 
their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their functions”; (3) encouraging 
witnesses to come forward; and (4) discouraging perjury. Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 
39, 43 (2d Cir. 1996). In Peterson, for example, the Second Circuit held a closure that 
was “1) extremely short, 2) followed by a helpful summation, and 3) entirely inadvertent” 
did not, in that instance, violate a defendant‟s Sixth Amendment rights. 85 F.3d at 44. 
Additionally, “the exclusion of a family member or friend may, in rare circumstances . . . 
, not implicate the Sixth Amendment public trial guarantee.” Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 
83, 94 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890-91 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (finding a district court‟s exclusion of the defendant‟s son to be a trivial closure 
insufficient to raise constitutional concerns). 
 Courts have continued to conduct triviality analyses in the wake of Presley’s 
holding that the Sixth Amendment extends to voir dire proceedings. In Barrows v. 
United States, 15 A.3d 673, 680-81 (D.C. 2011), the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia affirmed a conviction after concluding a “brief closure of the courtroom during 
voir dire” had not “seriously compromised the fairness or integrity of [the defendant‟s] 
trial.” And in Kelly v. State, 6 A.3d 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), the Maryland Court 
of Special Appeals considered the following factors determinative in holding a closure to 
have been de minimus:  
                                                                                                                                                             
failed to discern a systemic flaw. See Saldana, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75019, at *6-7, 30.  
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(1) the limited duration of the closure, two to three hours during voir dire; 
(2) that the closure did not encompass the entire proceedings of voir dire 
and jury selection, and that a significant portion of the proceedings during 
that time were not even audible to spectators in the courtroom; and (3) that 
the closure was a partial one [that encompassed only members of the 
defendant‟s family], and not a total exclusion of all spectators.” 
Id. at 411. 
 Moreover, courts have placed considerable emphasis on the role of the trial judge 
in assessing whether a closure is of constitutional magnitude and have resisted ascribing 
to judges the unauthorized actions of courthouse personnel. The Tenth Circuit has held 
that a defendant may not mount a successful Sixth Amendment claim in the absence of 
“some affirmative act by the trial court meant to exclude persons from the courtroom.” 
United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1994); see also id. at 154-55 (“The 
brief and inadvertent closing of the courthouse and hence the courtroom, unnoticed by 
any of the trial participants, did not violate the Sixth Amendment.”). The Fourth Circuit 
found a bailiff‟s temporary refusal to allow members of the public into the courtroom 
“entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation” when it “existed for but a 
short time and was quickly changed by the Court, when advised of the action of the 
bailiff.” Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1975). By contrast, when a trial 
judge is initially unaware of a closure but subsequently ratifies actions taken by 
courthouse personnel to limit access to the courtroom, such “ex-post approval” is 
sufficient to trigger constitutional considerations. United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 
572 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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 Mere inadvertence does not invariably preclude the finding of a Sixth Amendment 
violation. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven if the 
courtroom was closed because of inattention by the judge, courts have expressed concern 
in the past where a court officer‟s unauthorized closure of a courtroom impeded public 
access.”). Nonetheless, courts of appeals have unfailingly examined whether the trial 
judge either initiated or ratified the closure in order to pinpoint to whom such 
inadvertence is attributable. For example, in Owens, a colloquy between the trial judge 
and a U.S. Marshal prior to jury selection revealed the judge‟s awareness that the 
courtroom would have to be cleared of spectators in order to ensure seating for the entire 
jury panel. 483 F.3d at 54. As prospective jurors were dismissed and seating became 
available, marshals continued to bar the defendant‟s family members from entering the 
courtroom. Id. There, the First Circuit found the trial judge‟s passive role in perpetuating 
the closure did not absolve the court from its direct responsibility for the public being 




 Here, the closure was limited in both duration and scope and was therefore 
unlikely to jeopardize the aims served by the public trial guarantee. See, e.g., Peterson, 
                                                 
8
 Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 2004), to which Greene cites for the 
proposition that “[w]hether the closure was intentional or inadvertent is constitutionally 
irrelevant,” is similarly distinguishable. In Walton, the Seventh Circuit held a defendant‟s 
right to a public trial had been transgressed by a trial judge‟s decision to allow the 
prosecution to present its entire case during two late-evening sessions that took place 
after the courthouse had been closed and locked for the night. Id. at 432. 
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85 F.3d at 43-44; Braun, 227 F.3d at 919-20; Kelly, 6 A.3d at 411. Unlike in Owens, the 
partial closure occurred unbeknownst to the trial judge. Unlike in Presley, in which the 
defendant immediately objected to the exclusion, see 130 S. Ct. at 722, Greene never 
raised an objection and was thus complicit in allowing the court‟s unawareness of the 
closure to persist. And, unlike in Smith, the closure was not subsequently ratified by any 
affirmative act of the court. Reasoning that Presley does not fundamentally alter the 
nature of the triviality inquiry, the District Court stated “the Supreme Court did not 
intend the holding of Presley to be extended to unilateral actions taken by court security 
staff about which the trial judge was completely unaware.” See also United States v. 
Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 547-48 (1st Cir. 2010) (analogizing to Presley and focusing 
on the central role played by the trial judge in each matter in causing members of the 
public to be excluded from the voir dire); People v. Bui, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 594 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2010) (“We do not believe that Presley obviates consideration of the „de 
minimis‟ nature of a courtroom closure . . . .”). Therefore, the District Court properly 
concluded Greene did not suffer harm of constitutional dimension when a court security 
officer temporarily prevented his brother from entering the courtroom. Consequently, we 
will affirm the court‟s denial of Greene‟s motion for a new trial. 
B. 
 Second, Greene contends the court abused its discretion in rejecting his request to 
instruct the jury that it could convict only if it found Greene was acting outside the scope 
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of his police duties while in possession of the guns.
9
 In general, “a defendant is entitled to 
an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for 
a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 
1180 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court errs in refusing a 
requested instruction only if the omitted instruction is correct, is not substantially covered 
by other instructions, and is so important that its omission prejudiced the defendant.” 
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir. 1999). At bottom, we must determine 
“whether, viewed in light of the evidence, the charge as a whole fairly and adequately 
submits the issues in the case to the jury.” United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 
(3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, the court properly instructed the jury on each the four essential elements the 
government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to obtain a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(k) and 924(a)(1)(B).
10
 The court elaborated on its 
rationale for denying Greene‟s requested instruction at a sidebar conference immediately 
following the jury charge: 
There‟s no statutory defense in this case. I think you have eloquently and 
appropriately argued that if he had the weapon in the course of his police 
work, legitimately, that that would not constitute a crime. That was the 
point of the government‟s presentation, that he was outside the protocols. 
We spent hours and hours in testimony on that. And to give the instruction, 
                                                 
9
 We review a district court‟s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Weatherly, 525 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2008).  
10
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), it is unlawful “to possess or receive any firearm which has 
had the importer‟s or manufacturer‟s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and 
has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”  
12 
 
I think, tips the balance unnecessarily and unfairly in favor of the defense, 
and potentially directs a verdict for the defense. . . . [U]nless there was a 
statutory defense I could possibly give in that regard, you were not 
estopped from making the argument that he had [the firearms] pursuant to 
proper police work. 
Greene renewed his request prior to the jury being released for deliberations. Declining to 
rehash “each side‟s theory of the case,” the court once more rejected the request. 
 We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Greene his proposed 
jury instruction. Notably, Greene does not contest the court‟s finding that no “recognized 
defense” exists as to which the jury should have been instructed. See Isaac, 50 F.3d at 
1180. The court‟s language tracked the Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions, see Model 
Third Circuit Crim. Jury Instruction No. 6.18.922K, and Greene cites to no legal 
authority establishing possession within the lawful discharge of law enforcement duties 
as a viable defense to a charge under § 922(k). The court was not obligated to fashion an 
instruction with no basis in the law. See Davis, 183 F.3d at 250 (explaining a court abuses 
its discretion only if the proposed instruction is “correct”). Consequently, because the 
instruction “fairly and adequately submit[ted] the issues in the case to the jury,” see 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1264, we will deny Greene‟s request to vacate his conviction on this 
ground. 
C. 
 Next, Greene argues the District Court abused its discretion in excluding 
13 
 
testimony about his relationship with de Lugo.
11
 At trial, Greene testified he had placed 
the weapons in his backpack intending to surrender them to de Lugo for processing. 
When Greene‟s trial counsel inquired as to whether Greene “had occasion to turn over 
items to Corporal de Lugo in the past,” Greene answered in the affirmative, prompting 
the government to object. During a sidebar conference, the court instructed Greene‟s 
counsel to proffer the substance of the contemplated testimony as it pertained to Greene‟s 
previous encounters with de Lugo. Concluding Greene had failed to establish an adequate 
evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the testimony‟s relevance, the court sustained the 
objection.  
 To prevail on appeal, Greene must demonstrate the district court‟s evidentiary 
ruling was “arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.” Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 
Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Quite 
conspicuously, Greene offers no legal support for his assertion that this specific 
evidentiary ruling constituted an abuse of the court‟s discretion under these governing 
standards. Greene maintains the exclusion of this testimony irreparably prejudiced his 
defense by preventing him from describing the “informal process” that purportedly 
permitted him to possess the guns without proper paperwork provided he turn them over 
to de Lugo within some unspecified timeframe. However, the court did not preclude him 
                                                 
11
 We review a district court‟s decision “to admit or exclude evidence, if premised on a 
permissible view of the law, . . . for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Sokolow, 91 
F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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from attempting to lay an appropriate foundation for this line of testimony nor from 
introducing evidence of alternative departmental procedures for handling firearms.  
We need only consider whether “no reasonable person would adopt the district 
court‟s view.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Employing this deferential standard 
of review, we conclude the court acted within its discretion in sustaining the 
government‟s objection. Thus, we will deny Greene‟s request to vacate his convictions on 
this evidentiary basis. 
D. 
 Lastly, Greene contends the court conducted his sentencing hearing in a 
procedurally defective manner. See United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 
2008) (explaining that our responsibility on appellate review is “to ensure that a 
substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way”).12 
Specifically, in the course of evaluating the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), the court, on multiple occasions, referred to Greene as a “dirty” and “corrupt” 
officer. Greene contends the court‟s adjectival flourishes indicate his sentence was not 
imposed in accordance with the factors set forth in the sentencing guidelines. We 
disagree. 
                                                 
12
 We review sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). As the party 
challenging the sentence, Greene bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
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 Greene chiefly relies on United States v. Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 
2010), in which the Seventh Circuit vacated a sentence that fell squarely within the 
recommended guideline range after finding the district court‟s “extended discussion of 
topics that [were] both outside of the record and extraneous to any proper sentencing 
consideration” had tainted the procedural aspects of the defendant‟s sentencing. There, 
the sentencing court “digressed to discuss Figueroa‟s native Mexico, the immigration 
status of Figueroa and his sisters, and the conditions and laws in half a dozen other 
countries—not to mention unnecessary references to Hugo Chavez, Iranian terrorists, and 
Adolf Hitler‟s dog.” Id. at 741. Unable to determine whether this gratuitous “litany of 
inflammatory remarks” prejudiced the defendant, the appellate court remanded for 
resentencing. Id. at 744-45. 
 Here, the District Court‟s remarks were neither incendiary nor tangential. Read in 
context, the remarks were germane to the court‟s application of the second sentencing 
factor, namely the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the offense[,] 
[and] to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The 
court cited “endemic police corruption” as a societal scourge and lamented that “[i]f 
those who are sworn to protect citizens fail to obey the law themselves, we have 
enormous trouble.” Rather than serving as “an exemplar of good behavior,” Greene 
instead had been, in the estimation of the District Judge, “a dirty cop” whose actions had 
undermined popular confidence in law enforcement. Concluding it was necessary to 
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impose a term of imprisonment in order to avoid “depreciat[ing] the gravity of this 
offense,” the court expressly crafted its sentence with an eye on deterring similar 
conduct. The court‟s comments were not prejudicial and did not deprive Greene of a 
procedurally fair sentencing. 
 Having determined the court sentenced Greene in a procedurally sound fashion, 
we review the substantive reasonableness of Greene‟s sentence for an abuse of discretion 
and must affirm so long as the sentence “falls within the broad range of possible 
sentences that can be considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” United 
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008). The sentencing guidelines prescribed an 
imprisonment range of 27 to 33 months; the court sentenced Greene to 30 months. In so 
doing, the court rejected the government‟s recommendation that Greene be sentenced to 
the statutory maximum of five years imprisonment on each count to be served 
consecutively. According the trial court the measure of deference to which it is entitled, 
we are satisfied the sentence reflected a reasonable application of the § 3553(a) factors. 
See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[I]f the district 
court‟s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
the district court provided.”). 
 Therefore, we will deny Greene‟s request to vacate and remand for resentencing.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
